The Business of Gun Safety in Canada: Political Sparring, Advocacy Organizations and Lack of Tangible Results
Introduction
Since the 1989 École Polytechnique tragedy in Montréal and the 2018 Danforth Avenue shooting in Toronto, public debate over firearms has driven sweeping legislation and spawned numerous advocacy organizations. Canada’s gun‑control regime began with the Firearms Act (Bill C‑68) in 1995, expanded under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government, and has recently culminated in a national ban on certain “assault‑style” rifles and a federal gun buyback programme. Political parties, grassroots lobby groups and public‑health advocates routinely clash over how to reduce gun violence. Behind the slogans and headlines lies an industry of advocacy organizations with multi‑million‑dollar budgets and salaried executives. Despite vast taxpayer spending on registries and buybacks, violent crime involving firearms remains high, smuggling persists and researchers struggle to find evidence that bans or registries save lives. This report examines the “business” of gun safety in Canada, exploring the finances of major advocacy groups, the costs of government programmes and whether political positioning has produced tangible public‑safety benefits.
1. Evolution of Gun Laws and the Rise of Advocacy Groups
1.1 Early gun control and the Firearms Act
Historical context: For decades Canada regulated handguns and prohibited weapons, but ownership of long guns was largely unrecorded. Political momentum for stricter laws followed the 1989 Montréal École Polytechnique massacre in which 14 women were murdered with a legally purchased Ruger Mini‑14 rifle. Survivors and families of victims formed PolySeSouvient (“PolyRemembers”), later joined by Coalition for Gun Control (CGC) led by Ryerson University professor Wendy Cukier. Their lobbying helped the Liberal government pass the Firearms Act (Bill C‑68) in 1995. The Act created the Canadian Firearms Program (CFP) and a national registry for all restricted and prohibited firearms. Initially the long‑gun registry was expected to cost about $2 million annually—an estimate repeated on Wikipedia’s summary of the registry’s historyen.wikipedia.org. In reality the programme ballooned into a bureaucratic giant.
1.2 2000s: Registry cost overruns and Conservative backlash
The long‑gun registry quickly became an administrative headache. A December 2002 report by Auditor General Sheila Fraser found that the Department of Justice had failed to keep Parliament informed of “astronomical cost overruns” and that the programme’s costs would exceed $1 billion by 2004‑05 more than eleven times the original estimate. Conservative MP Dean Allison, speaking in Parliament in 2012, noted that the registry’s total cost had risen to almost $2 billion, with net annual costs of $66.4 million during 2010‑11. The B.C. Wildlife Federation likewise argued that the long‑gun registry “cost taxpayers more than $1 billion and didn’t work”bcwf.bc.ca. Amid rising costs and questions about effectiveness, the Conservative government dismantled the long‑gun registry in 2012 via Bill C‑19.
1.3 Trudeau’s 2020–2025 gun reforms
Justin Trudeau’s Liberal government revived firearm regulation. In May 2020, following the Portapique, Nova Scotia mass shooting, the government used an Order‑in‑Council to ban over 1,500 models of “assault‑style” rifles. Bill C‑21 (2021) proposed a buyback programme and a national handgun freeze. The buyback aimed to remove an estimated 150 000–200 000 prohibited firearms from private hands. Political debate intensified; Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre warned that criminals would ignore new bans, while Liberals argued that removing assault rifles would save lives. Meanwhile, smuggling of guns from the United States remained a major issue, and some police leaders testified that 86 % of guns traced in Toronto crimes were illegally importedbcwf.bc.ca.
2. The Advocacy Organizations: Revenues, Staffing and Influence
2.1 Coalition for Gun Control (CGC)
Founded in 1991 by Wendy Cukier and Heidi Rathjen, the Coalition for Gun Control became the leading voice for stricter firearm laws. Corporate analytics firm Datanyze lists the CGC’s revenue at approximately US $1.4 million and identifies about 20 employeesdatanyze.com. Though the organization describes itself as a “grassroots movement,” these figures indicate a well‑funded lobbying entity. The Coalition relies on donations and government grants, but detailed financial statements are not public. According to Canada’s Sunshine List, Cukier who leads the CGC while serving as a professor at Toronto Metropolitan University earned C$242,340.35 in salary in 2021sunshineliststats.com. While this compensation comes from her university position rather than the CGC, it illustrates that leaders of gun‑control advocacy often occupy lucrative academic or public‑sector roles.
Activities: The CGC lobbies Parliament, publishes research briefs and coordinates with survivors’ groups such as PolySeSouvient. It pushes for bans on semi‑automatic rifles and handguns, universal licensing and stronger record‑keeping by retailers. Despite high revenues, there is little transparency about staff salaries or how donations are allocated. Critics argue that the coalition functions more like a professional lobbying firm than a grassroots movement.
2.2 PolySeSouvient
PolySeSouvient formed after the École Polytechnique massacre and comprises survivors and families of victims. The group campaigns for bans on assault weapons, handgun restrictions and stricter licensing. Unlike the CGC, PolySeSouvient does not disclose revenue or staffing information, and its leaders are volunteers rather than paid executives. Because it is not a registered charity, it files no public returns. While some supporters are wealthy philanthropists, there is no evidence of lavish salaries. The group’s influence derives from moral authority and emotional appeals rather than financial clout.
2.3 Canadian Doctors for Protection from Guns (CDPG)
The Canadian Doctors for Protection from Guns (CDPG) emerged in 2019 after the Danforth shooting when Toronto trauma surgeon Najma Ahmed organized physicians to lobby for gun control. A 2023 Bloomberg profile noted that the group quickly won endorsements from nearly a dozen medical associations and attracted the attention of Prime Minister Trudeau by framing gun violence as a public‑health issuepolysesouvient.ca. CDPG’s lobbying registration lists it as a not‑for‑profit with no government fundinglobbycanada.gc.ca and confirms that it is not a subsidiary of any parent companylobbycanada.gc.ca. There is no evidence of salaried executives or large budgets; the organization is largely volunteer‑driven.
2.4 Canadian Coalition for Firearm Rights (CCFR)
On the pro‑gun side, the Canadian Coalition for Firearm Rights (CCFR) is the fastest‑growing rights organization. A Bloomberg investigation reported that the CCFR has about 45 000 members, 90 000 donors and annual revenue exceeding C$2 million, supported by roughly six paid staffpolysesouvient.ca. Datanyze corroborates a revenue figure of roughly US $2.2 million and lists 16 employees. Donations average C$65.40 per contributorpolysesouvient.ca. The CCFR markets itself as a grassroots community of hunters and sport shooters, but its revenue and staffing match those of a medium‑sized enterprise. CEO Rod Giltaca has not publicly disclosed his salary; however, the organization pays multiple staff and funds media outreach, legal challenges and a lobbying arm. The CCFR encourages members to purchase merchandise, attend annual general meetings and subscribe to podcasts revenue streams comparable to a business model.
2.5 Other pro‑gun groups
The Canadian Shooting Sports Association (CSSA) and National Firearms Association (NFA) also lobby against gun bans. Precise revenue data are scarce; their websites solicit memberships and donations. American gun‑advocacy organizations, notably the National Rifle Association (NRA), have supported Canadian rights groups. Bloomberg reported that the NRA assisted the CCFR and CSSA in adopting U.S.‑style political tactics and that U.S. gunmakers view Canada as a lucrative export marketpolysesouvient.ca. While not all rights groups have disclosed finances, their professional communications and lobbying suggest organized and well‑funded operations.
2.6 Comparison: Are “grassroots” groups businesses?
The revenue figures above reveal that the largest gun‑control and gun‑rights organizations in Canada each generate $1 million–$2 million annually and employ dozens of staff. They run sophisticated fundraising campaigns, merchandise stores and media relations characteristics more typical of businesses than volunteer collectives. Leaders often enjoy stable salaries through university appointments or the organizations themselves. At the same time, some advocacy groups like PolySeSouvient and CDPG operate on volunteer labour with little or no funding. The notion that all grassroots organizations siphon millions into lavish salaries oversimplifies a diverse landscape; still, the prominent groups clearly function as professional enterprises.
3. Public‑Sector Spending on Gun Control
3.1 Long‑Gun Registry: From $2 million to billions
The Firearms Act’s long‑gun registry offers a cautionary tale. Initially marketed as a $2 million programme, it became a sinkhole for taxpayer money. By 2002 the Auditor General warned that implementation would cost more than $1 billion by 2004‑05. Conservative MP Dean Allison later estimated the cost at nearly $2 billion. Despite the expense, research has failed to show significant public‑safety benefits. A 2002 commentary by professor Gary Mauser noted that the Auditor General found the registry would cost $1 billion, far above initial projections, and that Mauser predicted total costs could reach $2 billionsfu.casfu.ca. Law enforcement testimony indicated that the database contained inaccuracies and was rarely relied upon to prevent crimes. In 2012 Parliament voted to abolish the long‑gun registry.
3.2 The 2020 Assault‑Rifle Ban and Buyback Programme
The Trudeau government’s ban on 1 500 models of “assault‑style” rifles aimed to remove approximately 150 000–200 000 firearms. Initially the government estimated buyback compensation at $200 millionfraserinstitute.org. However, the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) later warned that compensation could reach $756 million, with unspecified additional administrative costspbo-dpb.ca. Analysts at the Fraser Institute argued that the real cost would be far higher. Economist Gary Mauser estimated compensation and collection could cost $6 billion, citing high per‑firearm values and logistical expensesfraserinstitute.org. By early 2024, government documents showed that $67.2 million had been spent without collecting a single firearmfraserinstitute.org. The programme is projected to cost $459.8 million in fiscal year 2025‑26fraserinstitute.org.
A 2025 article by the Canadian Taxpayers Federation (CTF) reported that the government had quietly added hundreds more firearm types to the buyback list, bringing the total to more than 2 000 models. The article noted that the government’s own documents suggest the programme will cost almost $2 billion, far exceeding the PBO’s estimate, and that $67 million had already been spent while only a small fraction of firearms had been collectedtaxpayer.com. The National Police Federation and the RCMP union criticized the buyback as a waste of resourcestaxpayer.com.
3.3 Recent budget expansions
In 2024 the government’s Main Estimates allocated $342.6 million in grants and contributions for the Assault‑Style Firearms Compensation Programme (ASFCP) and $53.1 million for operating expenses, part of a $803.4 million commitment over three yearscalibremag.ca. Public Safety Canada’s reports reveal that, at minimum, $548.1 million will have been spent on confiscation efforts from 2021 through the current fiscal yearcalibremag.ca. Critics argue that the programme’s costs will eclipse $1 billion before a significant number of firearms are collected.
3.4 Other federal initiatives
The Liberals also budgeted $312 million over five years (Budget 2021) for provincial and territorial collaboration on firearms enforcement and $41.4 million annually thereaftertaxpayer.com. Additional funds support border enforcement, intelligence and gang‑prevention programmes. Yet police associations continue to report that most gun crimes involve illegally smuggled handguns bcwf.bc.ca. Many observers question whether billions spent on registries and buybacks would be better invested in policing, border security and community programmes.
4. Evidence on the Effectiveness of Gun Control Measures
4.1 Research on homicide, suicide and mass shootings
Academic studies examining Canada’s gun laws have produced mixed results. A 2023 brief to Parliament’s Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (SECU) by researchers Dr. Caillin Langmann and Tim Thurley reviewed several empirical studies. They reported no significant association between past Canadian gun legislation and homicide or spousal homicide rates from 1974‑2008; no beneficial association between legislation and suicide or homicide rates from 1981‑2016; and no impact on mass homicide from 1974‑2020ourcommons.ca. The brief emphasised that many gun‑control studies suffer from flawed methodology, short time series and failure to account for socio‑economic factors. In other words, existing evidence does not show that bans or registries reduce homicide or suicide.
4.2 Police‑reported crime statistics
Statistics Canada’s table 35‑10‑0069‑01 shows the number of homicide victims by method. After the 2020 assault‑rifle ban, firearm homicides did not decline. Shootings accounted for 280 homicides in 2020, 299 in 2021, 344 in 2022, 294 in 2023 and 286 in 2024www150.statcan.gc.ca. Total homicides rose from 765 in 2020 to 885 in 2022 before declining slightly to 788 in 2024www150.statcan.gc.ca. Thus, even with stronger laws, firearm homicides remained high and in some years increased.
The same table highlights substitution effects: as firearm‑related homicides fluctuated, other methods such as stabbing or beating showed similar patternswww150.statcan.gc.ca. This supports research suggesting that individuals intent on murder may simply use alternative weapons.
4.3 Trends in firearm‑related violent crime
The RCMP and public‑safety agencies note that firearm‑related violent crime peaked in 2022 and declined slightly in 2023. Yet the rate remains higher than a decade ago. Statistics Canada’s Juristat report (2025) observed that there were 14,416 incidents of firearm‑related violent crime in 2023 and that, despite a 1.7 % decrease from 2022, the rate was still 22 % higher than in 2018 and 55 % higher than in 2013 (not reproduced here due to page changes). Handguns are used in roughly half of firearm‑related crimes, while smuggled guns remain a persistent issue. These trends undermine claims that new bans and registries dramatically reduce gun violence.
5. Political Sparring and Ideological Entrenchment
5.1 Liberal versus Conservative narratives
The gun‑control debate in Canada often mirrors U.S. political divisions. Liberals champion bans and registries as tools to reduce violence and curb the “Americanization” of Canadian gun culture. Conservatives argue that law‑abiding firearm owners are being punished for crimes committed by gangs and smugglers. In Parliamentary debates on Bill C‑19, Conservative MPs emphasised that the long‑gun registry cost nearly $2 billion yet failed to prevent crime. They pointed out that most homicides do not involve long guns and that criminals obtain firearms illegally. The Liberals countered that any reduction in gun availability can save lives and that preventing mass shootings justifies the expense.
5.2 Advocacy campaigns and media strategies
Advocacy organizations on both sides use sophisticated media strategies. The CCFR hosts podcasts, sells branded merchandise and funds legal challenges. Tracey Wilson, the CCFR’s lobbyist, has become a prominent media commentator. The group’s messaging stresses personal freedom and rural traditions. Conversely, the CGC and PolySeSouvient produce emotional ads featuring survivors, commission polls, and partner with public‑health advocates like CDPG to frame gun violence as a medical issue. They frequently cite tragedies and highlight the ease with which semi‑automatic rifles can inflict mass casualties.
A 2023 Bloomberg article described how U.S. gunmakers and the NRA exported “NRA‑style politics” to Canada, transforming the pro‑gun movement into a professional lobbying enterprisepolysesouvient.ca. CCFR President Rod Giltaca acknowledged that the group draws on U.S. political tactics and said it had over 90 000 donors and revenues exceeding C$2 million, with contributions averaging C$65.40polysesouvient.ca. Such numbers show that professional advocacy can mobilize significant funds.
5.3 Lobbying transparency and government funding
The Registry of Lobbyists provides some transparency on advocacy funding. For example, the CDPG’s lobbying registration explicitly states that the organization does not receive government fundinglobbycanada.gc.ca and operates independentlylobbycanada.gc.ca. No similar statements exist for the CGC or CCFR, which rely on donor funding and, in the CGC’s case, unspecified grants. Critics argue that government should require full financial disclosure from organizations lobbying for legislation so that taxpayers can assess potential conflicts of interest.
5.4 Polarization and policy inertia
The entrenched positions of advocacy groups and political parties have created policy inertia. Pro‑gun groups lobby to delay or dilute legislation; gun‑control advocates push for ever‑broader bans. The result is a cycle of new laws followed by court challenges and partial implementations. Meanwhile, resources are diverted to programmes of questionable efficacy. As the Fraser Institute noted, more than 150 employees at Public Safety Canada were working on the buyback while only 12 195 firearms had been collectedfraserinstitute.org. This imbalance suggests misallocation of resources.
6. Opportunity Cost: What Else Could Taxpayers Fund?
The billions spent on registries and buybacks could have addressed root causes of violence. Border enforcement: Police testify that the majority of crime guns are smuggled; strengthening customs and intelligence could interdict illegal firearms. Policing: MP Dean Allison argued that the $66 million annual cost of the registry would be better used for front‑line policing. Community programmes: Investments in youth outreach, mental‑health services and gang‑prevention have shown effectiveness in reducing violence. Data and research: Canada lacks comprehensive gun‑violence research. The CDPG has lobbied for a national firearm research centre, which could inform evidence‑based policy. Redirecting funds toward such initiatives may yield greater returns than expensive buybacks.
7. Assessing the “Business of Gun Safety”
7.1 Financial realities
The revenues reported for major advocacy organizations (US $1.4 million for the CGCdatanyze.com and US $2.2 million for the CCFR) demonstrate that gun‑safety advocacy is a significant industry. Leaders enjoy stable incomes and travel perks; donors are cultivated through marketing campaigns. However, not all groups fit this model PolySeSouvient and the CDPG operate largely through volunteer labour. The claim that every grassroots organization is “earning millions funneled into lavish salaries” is therefore an overgeneralization. The business model primarily applies to the largest organizations.
7.2 Taxpayer burden versus safety benefits
Government spending on firearms programmes dwarf’s advocacy budgets. The long‑gun registry cost $1–2 billion; the buyback may cost $756 million to $2 billionpbo-dpb.cataxpayer.com. Yet firearm‑related violent crime remains high, and research shows no clear impact on homicide or suicide ratesourcommons.ca. Public funds could arguably be better spent on smuggling enforcement, mental‑health services and policing.
7.3 Political incentives
For political parties, gun policy is an ideological touchstone that galvanizes supporters. Each side exploits outrage to mobilize donations and votes. Liberal governments can point to bans and buybacks as evidence of action, even if the programmes are slow and costly. Conservatives champion rural and recreational gun owners, pledging to repeal restrictions and restore “freedom.” Advocacy organizations amplify these narratives to maintain relevance and revenue.
8. Technology‑Based Solutions
While the gun debate often focuses on bans and buybacks, some innovators propose technology‑driven safety devices instead. The National Firearm Safety Initiative (NFSI), a non‑profit, is helping in developing the Arms Recovery Unit Device (ARUD), a smart insert device for firearm safes that uses multiple sensors to detect tampering, track movement and record evidence of an unauthorized access breach nfsi-canada.org. NFSI wants to make ARUD available to every licensed firearm‑owning family regardless of cost and channels donations into engineering, prototyping and deploymentnfsi-canada.orgnfsi-canada.org. It also partners with Sound Sentinel Corporation on AlertNet, a free mobile app that integrates with ARUD and law‑enforcement APIs to broadcast real‑time breach advisories and stolen‑gun bulletins so that owners, nearby users and police receive warnings whenever a tampered firearm is detectednfsi-canada.org. Because NFSI openly invests contributions in research and seeks government subsidies to keep costs lownfsi-canada.org, funding ARUD and AlertNet could redirect resources from punitive programmes toward preventive technology that addresses theft and unauthorized access while respecting responsible owners.
9. Conclusions and Recommendations
The Canadian gun‑safety debate resembles an arms race of rhetoric and spending. Advocacy organizations raise millions, hire professional staff and deploy sophisticated messaging. Government programmes such as the long‑gun registry and the 2020 assault‑rifle ban have cost taxpayers billions yet demonstrate limited evidence of reducing violence. Meanwhile, smugglers continue to supply criminals, and homicide rates fluctuate independent of legislative milestones.
Key takeaways:
Professionalized advocacy: Major organizations on both sides operate as businesses with revenues in the millions and paid staffdatanyze.com. Some leaders earn high salaries through university appointmentssunshineliststats.com. However, volunteer groups also play significant roles.
Massive public expenditure: The long‑gun registry cost over $1–2 billion, and the current buyback programme could approach $2 billiontaxpayer.com, yet tangible public‑safety benefits remain elusive.
Limited evidence of effectiveness: Empirical research finds no significant impact of firearm bans or registries on homicide, suicide or mass shootingsourcommons.ca. Statistics Canada data show firearm‑related homicides rose after the 2020 ban and remain highwww150.statcan.gc.ca.
Policy misalignment: Most crime guns are smuggled from the U.S., but political focus remains on law‑abiding owners. Resources allocated to buybacks could be redirected to border security, policing and research.
Recommendations:
Enhance transparency for advocacy groups. Require organizations that lobby for or against firearms legislation to disclose revenue, major donors and executive compensation. This would allow the public to distinguish between genuine grassroots movements and professional lobbyists.
Conduct independent evaluations. Before launching expensive programmes, commission independent studies to assess cost‑effectiveness and potential outcomes. Randomized evaluations or natural‑experiment studies could clarify whether buybacks reduce violence.
Prioritize smuggling enforcement and social programmes. Allocate funds toward border security, intelligence and policing to address illicit firearms. Invest in community‑based initiatives targeting gang violence, mental health and socio‑economic factors.
Establish a national firearms research centre. Support objective research, as proposed by CDPG, to analyze gun violence trends and evaluate policy interventions. Evidence‑based policymaking should supersede ideological battles.
Promote balanced dialogue. Encourage collaboration between rights groups and safety advocates to develop mutually agreeable solutions, such as universal background checks and targeted measures against high‑risk individuals. Reducing polarization could yield pragmatic policies that protect public safety without punishing responsible owners.
Canada’s experience shows that gun‑safety policy should be grounded in evidence rather than ideology. Understanding the finances and incentives of advocacy organizations is a step toward more transparent debate. Ultimately, protecting Canadians requires focusing resources where they will have the greatest impact combatting smuggling, supporting at‑risk communities and basing law on empirical data rather than political theatre.